TOKYO - A 60-day ceasefire between the United States and Iran expired in August without an agreement to extend it, underscoring what can be viewed as "indecisive" politics common to both countries.
The United States, under the administration of President Donald Trump, carried out attacks on Iran for 13 consecutive days in July but failed to extract a compromise from Tehran on reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
In retaliation, Iran attacked U.S. military bases in Persian Gulf states and critical infrastructure including desalination facilities with missiles and drones. The U.S. military exposed the limits of its ability to protect both its own forces and Gulf states from Iranian retaliation, forcing Trump to halt the attacks.
The United States lacks aides capable of restraining a one-man president fixated on projecting "victory" and saving face, then translating military superiority into political gains to end the war.
Iran's system, for its part, lacks a decision-maker and has only deputies. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has long served as a behind-the-scenes coordinator and deputy under his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, liaising with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and security agencies.
Since being selected as supreme leader, Mojtaba has not appeared in public. Although there are reports he was injured, his absence suggests his intention to rule from the shadows.
His governing style is also evident in a recent key appointment. Ali Abdollahi, named chief of staff overseeing both the Iranian Armed Forces and the IRGC, has been known for his role as a coordinator, serving in aide positions across various organizations, such as deputy commander in the IRGC air force, deputy of the police command, and deputy interior minister for security and law enforcement affairs.
The appointment appears intended to prevent commanders of the IRGC's combat units, who distinguished themselves in the confrontation with the United States, from gaining political influence at home.
Many figures around Mojtaba have connections with the IRGC, but they are not field commanders. They are deputies who have handled intelligence, security, special operations and coordination among organizations.
The supreme leader faces hard-line public opinion that overestimates the achievements of the IRGC's asymmetric warfare and argues that the Strait of Hormuz should remain closed until the United States withdraws.
Unlike his father, he lacks the political clout to command the military and the religious authority to mobilize the public. Instead, he appears to be seeking to preserve the regime by indirectly restraining the military and the public.
For Mojtaba, agreeing in negotiations with the United States to reopen the Strait of Hormuz would bring only domestic backlash, even if Iran collects transit fees. For Trump, recognizing Iranian interests in the strait would amount to admitting the failure of his attacks on Iran and invite fierce criticism at home.
Against this backdrop, reports that Iran-Oman talks have produced a proposed transit route through the Strait of Hormuz, with entry on the Iranian side and exit on the Omani side, merit attention.
There could be a scenario in which neither the United States nor Iran would conclude a formal agreement and only the shipping route would be set. The United States would eventually end its blockade of Iranian ports, while Iran would reopen the strait while collecting fees from passing vessels. An extension of the ceasefire without an agreement suggests a gradual transition to a "postwar order."
Yasunori Kawakami, a journalist with expertise in Middle East issues, was born in Nagasaki Prefecture in 1956. A graduate of Osaka University of Foreign Studies, now the University of Osaka, he was posted in Cairo, Jerusalem and Baghdad as a correspondent for The Asahi Shimbun and has worked freelance since 2015. His books include "The Reality of Hamas", and he produced the film "Outside, Inside the Wall: Reporting from Palestine and Israel."
