TOKYO - The review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is currently being held under an extremely harsh environment. In February, the U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expired, eliminating a mechanism for stably maintaining nuclear-related relations between major powers.

The shared understanding of seeking stable relations has shifted among major powers and the mode of relations is moving toward how to gain an advantage over rivals with limited resources.

China's continued military buildup without showing interest in arms control, and Russia's pursuit of unusual weapons such as nuclear-powered torpedoes, can be seen as moves aimed at preventing the United States from establishing superiority in the deterrence game.

The United States, too, is pursuing superiority while taking steps to counter China and Russia, including developing a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, a situation in which no one is seeking stability or the status quo.

Arms control is the baseline for nuclear disarmament. Disarmament is an effort to reduce risks and shrink forces on the foundation of stability among nuclear-armed states. But there is no such momentum among the United States, China and Russia, with Russia brandishing nuclear threats over Ukraine and U.S. President Donald Trump trying to move Iran with language evoking nuclear use by saying "a whole civilization will die."

At the same time, with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons having entered into force, momentum toward abolishing nuclear weapons has grown, widening the gap in commitment to nuclear disarmament between countries that support the ban treaty and those that say they need nuclear deterrence.

Even among non-nuclear states, those seeking to defend themselves under the nuclear umbrellas of allies find it hard to see how advancing nuclear disarmament under current conditions would make them safer, creating a wide gap with supporters of the ban treaty.

The U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran are also a major concern. Iran has amassed large quantities of highly enriched uranium at the 60 percent level and has attempted to produce uranium metal, making it hard to deny contradictions in its claims of purely civilian use.

Even so, it is undesirable to seek a solution to the nuclear issue through force rather than diplomacy, and the latest attacks must not become a bad precedent.

In addition, Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant came under attack and given the risk of radioactive material dispersal, any loss of restraint against striking civilian nuclear facilities is grave.

All of this suggests a pessimistic future for the NPT, but rather than wallowing in pessimism, the focus should be on how to achieve effective outcomes.

With the past two review conferences failing to produce an agreed document, a similar result this time could fuel doubts such as, "Is the NPT really useful? Does it have the ability to solve problems?"

What is crucial, therefore, is to show, as the consensus of all member states, a determination to uphold commitment to the NPT without fixating on the form of an agreed document, namely, for all members to reaffirm their faith that the NPT is a cornerstone of international security and to confirm trust in the NPT regime.

Many countries have come to believe they have no choice but to increase reliance on nuclear weapons. Despite that reality, we should reaffirm past declarations "Make Nagasaki the last atomic-bombed city" and "A nuclear war cannot be won" and demonstrate a commitment to continue a history of no use of nuclear weapons. On that basis, we need to clearly state the lofty goal humanity should pursue to aim for a world without nuclear weapons.

 

(Nobumasa Akiyama, born in 1967, is a professor at Hitotsubashi University specializing in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and also serves as director of the Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.)